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CROP DUSTING: TWO THEORIES OF LIABILITY?
THE aerial application of pesticides has become the farmer's most
potent weapon against crop-killing pests.' In California, over 75 per-
cent of all commercial agricultural pest control work is done by air-
craft.2 The use of pesticides3 has also become an important aid to the
farmer in controlling weeds and harvesting crops.4  Yet the crop
dusting 5 program for one crop may mean destruction to a neighboring
crop.
Gotreaux v. Gary6 was the first case to impose strict liability
upon a landowner for crop damage resulting from crop dusting. Two
other courts have since adopted the theory of strict liability.7 How-
ever, most of the courts that have considered the question have pro-
ceeded to discuss liability in terms of negligence. How serious is the
apparent disagreement among the courts? Within which theory of
liability, whether negligence or strict liability, does crop dusting prop-
erly fall? The purpose of this comment is to seek an answer to these
questions. The means employed in this search are to review briefly
the hazards encountered in crop dusting, to examine the cases to deter-
mine how the theories of liability have been applied to crop dusting
and, from the perspective afforded by such endeavors, to consider
some of the factors involved in deciding which theory ought to be
applied to this activity.
The Hazards of Crop Dusiing'
An awareness of the hazards encountered in crop dusting is essen-
tial to fully appreciate the challenge of conflicting interests presented
to the courts by this activity. Two features, unique to crop dusting,
1 Tozer, Farmer's Air Force, FLYiNG, Aug. 1960, at 22-25.
2 CALIFoRNIA DFP'T OF AGRICULTURE, BULL. No. E-82-8 (Sept. 23, 1966).
3 The term "pesticides" includes not only all chemicals used to control,
destroy, or mitigate pests, but also herbicides (weed and brush killers, de-
foliants, and desiccants). PEsTIcIDE HANDBOOK-ENTOMA 21 (18th ed. D. Frear
1966).
4 Tozer, supra note 1, at 23.
G The term "crop dusting" is used throughout this comment to denote
the aerial application of pesticides, both in dust and spray forms. Occasionally,
the technical distinction between these two forms will be made for the sake
of clarity and emphasis.
6 232 La. 373, 94 So. 2d 293 (1957), noted in 32 TuL. L. REv. 146 (1957).
7 Young v. Darter, 363 P.2d 829 (Okla. 1961); Loe v. Lenhardt, 227 Ore.
242, 362 P.2d 312 (1961).
8 For a good introduction to this subject, see Note, Crop Dusting: Legal
Problems in a New Industry, 6 STAN. L. REv. 69, 70-72 (1953); Comment,
Crop Dusting-Scope of Liability and a Need for Reform in the Texas Law,
40 TExAs L. REv. 527 (1962).
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combine to make it an inherently dangerous activity.9 One unique
feature may be classified as the chemical hazard. For example, a com-
monly used chemical, known as 2,4-D, produces beneficial results when
applied to rice or wheat, but is deadly poison to cotton, tomatoes and
grapes.10 Arsenicals that save cotton from destruction by insects
may also destroy livestock and colonies of bees.1 1
The other unique feature is drift. Drift of chemicals to neigh-
boring land is largely responsible for damage caused by crop dusting.12
Control of drift and the accurate prediction of the extent of drift are
the two interrelated, though separate, problems which frustrate ef-
forts to prevent such damage. The extent to which particles will
drift depends on many factors, the most important of which include:
altitude, the size of the released particles, air movement (wind and
convection), temperature, and humidity.'3
To some degree, the altitude from which particles fall can be con-
trolled. The lower the particles are released, the better are the
chances that they will land on target since adverse atmospheric forces
have less time to affect distribution under such circumstances. Air
disturbances created by the airplaine, however, hamper efforts to con-
trol this critical altitude.'4 Even though a plane flies low over the
ground as it releases a spray or dust, the aerodynamic turbulence lifts
some of the material 10 to 20 feet above the level of flight.1 The
higher the particles are lifted, the longer it takes for them to fall to
the ground, and the greater is the danger that they will be carried
away by the air flow.
Because effective dusting requires that a small amount of mate-
rial be spread evenly over a large area,16 the size of the distributed
particles, whether applied in powder or liquid form, is quite small;
9 Cases holding that crop dusting is an inherently dangerous activity
include: S. A. Gerrard Co. v. Fricker, 42 Ariz. 503, 27 P.2d 678 (1933); Pen-
dergrass v. Lovelace, 57 N.M. 661, 262 P.2d 231 (1953); Leonard v. Abbott,
357 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 366 S.W.2d 925
(Tex. 1963); see Miles v. A. Arena & Co., 23 Cal. App. 2d 680, 73 P.2d 1260
(1937). Contra, Pitchfork Land & Cattle Co. v. King, 162 Tex. 331, 346 S.W.2d
598 (1961), criticized in Comment, Crop Dusting--Scope of Liability and a
Need for Reform in the Texas Law, 40 TEXAS L. REV. 527, 536 (1962).
10 See D. FaRAR, CHEMISTRy OF THE PESTICIDES 370 (3rd ed. 1955); PEsTI-
CIDE HANDBOoK-ENToMA 22 (18th ed. D. Frear ed. 1966).
11 See, e.g., Sanders v. Beckwith, 79 Ariz. 67, 283 P.2d 235 (1955); Ham-
mond Ranch Corp. v. Dodson, 199 Ark. 846, 136 S.W.2d 484 (1940); McPherson
v. Billington, 399 S.W.2d 186 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
12 How to Reduce Spray Drift, SUCCESSFuL FARMING, March 1967, at 87.
13 Bellomy, Bugs are Big Business, FLYING, June 1956, at 37, 73.
14 Rollins, Drift of Pesticides, AGRICULTURAL CHEMICALS, March 1961, at
34, 35.
10 Id.
16 Bellomy, supra note 13, at 71; Rollins, supra note 14.
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particles range from less than 10 to over 400 microns17 in size.'8 Be-
cause of their minute size and light weight, the slightest wind will
carry these particles hundreds of feet.19 For example, when dropped
from an altitude of 10 feet in a wind of 3 miles per hour, a 10-micron
particle will travel I mile.20 Given the wind velocity, the particle size,
and the height of the drop, it is possible to predict the distance the
particle will drift. Even with sophisticated nozzle equipment, how-
ever, the size of the particles cannot be completely controlled: droplet
size in one application may vary as much as 400 microns.21 When
droplet size varies this much, accurate prediction of drift is difficult.22
Perhaps the most variable and unpredictable factor affecting drift
is weather. Because of their small size and light weight, particles
settle to the ground slowly. A wind of any velocity will tend to carry
the particles away from the target area. Moreover, it is impossible
for an applicator 23 to anticipate the sudden shifts of air currents
which may affect the distribution of the particles he releases. 24
A dead calm, though, may present just as much difficulty as does
wind.25 When the air is still, temperature inversion frequently de-
velops. Under such conditions, the particles settle to the ground more
slowly than usual.26 In fact, the particles tend to hang in the air and
may vaporize.27 While the particles remain suspended, diurnal winds
may develop and carry them far from the target area.2 It has been
estimated that under such conditions drift propensities are five times
greater than under normal conditions.29
Even with specialized equipment and greater knowledge, the
problem of controlling drift has not been solved, nor has the predic-
17 A micron is a unit of length. It signifies one-millionth of a meter. A
250-micron particle is about the size of the period at the end of this sentence.
Is Note, Crop Dusting: Legal Problems in a New Industry, 6 STAN. L.
REv. 69, 73 (1953); see ULV Will It Steal the Market?, FAm C1mvICALs, July
1967, at 10, 58; Rollins, supra note 14, at 35.
19 Rollins, supra note 14.
20 Id.
21 Note 18 supra.
22 Bellomy, supra note 13, at 73.
23 The label "applicator" is generally placed upon those persons who are
engaged in the business of aerially applying pesticides to crops and other
plant life.
24 Note, supra note 18, at 74.
25 Interview with Stuart W. Turner, Consulting Agrologist, Stuart W.
Turner & Co., in San Francisco, Aug. 28, 1967 [hereinafter referred to as
Interview with Stuart W. Turner]. It should be pointed out that Mr. Turner
does not necessarily concur in the conclusions drawn by this writer.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.; see Akesson & Yates, Drift Residues, FAmu CmaVIcALs, April 1962,
at 44, 46.
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tion of drift advanced to any certainty.30
Status of Liability: A Survey"'
For the foregoing reasons the Oregon Supreme Court in Loe v.
Lenhrdt32 held crop dusting to be an ultrahazardous activity and
adopted the theory of strict liability. Four years earlier, Louisiana in
applying civil law imposed strict liability upon crop dusting activi-
ties.33 Shortly after the Oregon decision, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
held crop dusting subject to the rules of strict liability. Some 52 cases
involving actions brought by neighboring property owners against ap-
plicators and/or landowners for damage allegedly caused by the appli-
cation of pesticides have been reported in 18 jurisdictions.3 " Yet, only
three jurisdictions have declared crop dusting to be an activity subject
to strict liability.36
The remaining 15 jurisdictions approach the problem in terms
of negligence whether the pesticide is released in the air or on the
ground.37 The results in these jurisdictions, however, are striking.
In the 44 reported cases, the plaintiff has recovered on 30 occasions.3 8
30 Rollins, supra note 14; ULV Will It Steal the Market?, FARM CHEMIcALs,
July 1967, at 10, 16.
31 The liability of the manufacturer of crop dusting chemicals is beyond
the scope of this survey. For cases on that subject see, e.g., Walton v. Sherwin-
Williams Co., 191 F.2d 277 (8th Cir. 1951); Reasor-Hill Corp. v. Kennedy, 224
Ark. 248, 272 S.W.2d 685 (1954); Chapman Chem. Co. v. Taylor, 215 Ark. 630,
222 S.W.2d 820 (1949); Burr v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268
P.2d 1041 (1954); LaPlant v. E.X DuPont de Nemours & Co., 346 S.W.2d 231
(Mo. Ct. App. 1961); Rose v. Buffalo Air Serv., 170 Neb. 806, 104 N.W.2d
431 (1960); McClanahan v. California Spray-Chemical Corp., 194 Va. 842, 75
S.E.2d 712 (1953); Golden Gate Hop Ranch, Inc. v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 66
Wash. 2d 469, 403 P.2d 351 (1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1025 (1966).
32 227 Ore. 242, 362 P.2d 312 (1961).
33 Gotreaux v. Gary, 232 La. 373, 94 So. 2d 293 (1957).
34 Young v. Darter, 363 P.2d 829 (Okla. 1961).
35 These jurisdictions are: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Idaho,
Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia. See
cases cited notes 32-34 supra and note 38 infra.
36 Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Oregon. See notes 32-34 supra.
37 Notes 35 and 36 supra.
38 Recovery allowed: Sanders v. Beckwith, 79 Ariz. 67, 283 P.2d 235
(1955) (dairy herd injured by DDT and benzene hexachloride); Crouse v.
Wilbur-Ellis Co., 77 Ariz. 359, 272 P.2d 352 (1954) (cantaloupe damaged by
insecticide containing sulfur); Lundberg v. Bolon, 67 Ariz. 259, 194 P.2d 454
(1948) (bees killed by arsenical); S.A. Gerrard Co. v. Fricker, 42 Ariz. 503,
27 P.2d 678 (1933) (bees killed by insecticide Dutox No. 20); Heeb v. Prysock,
219 Ark. 899, 245 S.W.2d 577 (1952) (cotton damaged by 2,4-D); W.B. Bynum
Cooperage Co. v. Coulter, 219 Ark. 818, 244 S.W.2d 955 (1952) (cotton dam-
aged by 2,4-D); McKennon v. Jones, 219 Ark. 671, 244 S.W.2d 138 (1951)
(bees killed by R-H dust; R-H dust is DDT); Kennedy v. Clayton, 216 Ark.
851, 227 S.W.2d 934 (1950) (cotton damaged by 2,4-D); Burns v. Vaughn, 216
Ark. 128, 224 S.W.2d 365 (1949) (cotton damaged by 2,4-D); Chapman Chem.
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In five cases the plaintiff failed to establish causation.39 In a sixth
Co. v. Taylor, 215 Ark. 630, 222 S.W.2d 820 (1949) (cotton damaged by 2,4-D);
Hammond Ranch Corp. v. Dodson, 199 Ark. 846, 136 S.W.2d 484 (1940) (live-
stock killed by arsenical); Parks v. Atwood Crop Dusters, Inc., 118 Cal. App.
2d 368, 257 P.2d 653 (1953) (immature cotton damaged by cyanamide dust);
Adams v. Henning, 117 Cal. App. 2d 376, 255 P.2d 456 (1953) (potatoes dam-
aged by 2,4-D; nonsuit reversed); Miles v. A. Arena & Co., 23 Cal. App. 2d
680, 73 P.2d 1260 (1937) (bees killed by arsenical); Kentucky Aerospray, Inc.
v. Mays, 251 S.W.2d 460 (Ky. 1952) (commercially raised minnows killed by
toxaphene); Lawler v. Skelton, 241 Miss. 274, 130 So. 2d 565 (1961) (plain-
tiff injured by malathion); Faire v. Burke, 363 Mo. 562, 252 S.W.2d 289
(1952); Pendergrass v. Lovelace, 57 N.M. 661, 262 P.2d 231 (1953) (cotton
damaged by 2,4-D); McPherson v. Billington, 399 S.W.2d 186 (Tex. Civ. App.
1965) (hogs killed by arsenical); Pitchfork Land & Cattle Co. v. King, 162
Tex. 331, 346 S.W.2d 598 (1961) (cotton damaged by herbicide); Aerial
Sprayers, Inc. v. Yerger, Hill & Son, 306 S.W.2d 433 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957)
(cotton damaged by 2,4-D); Dallas County Flood Control Dist. v. Fowler, 280
S.W.2d 336 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) (cotton damaged by 2,4-D); see Stull Chem.
Co. v. Boggs Farmers Supply, Inc., 404 S.W.2d 78 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966)
(cotton damaged by 2,4-D); cf. Schronk v. Gilliam, 380 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1964) (cotton damaged by poisonous spray).
Recovery allowed but distinguishable on the facts: Southwestern Bell
Tel. Co. v. Smith, 220 Ark. 223, 247 S.W.2d 16 (1952) (livestock killed by
grazing on land sprayed with 2,4-D); Brown v. Sioux City, 242 Iowa 1196, 49
N.W.2d 853 (1951) (bees killed by ground spraying of chlorodane); Bivins
v. Southern Ry., 247 N.C. 711, 102 S.E.2d 128 (1958) (garden, fruit tree and
pasture damaged by ground spraying of poisonous chemicals); Smith v. Oker-
son, 8 N.J. Super. 560, 73 A.2d 857 (Super. Ct. 1950) (livestock killed by
ground spraying of 2,4-D); Alexander v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 221 S.C. 477,
71 S.E.2d 299 (1952) (cotton damaged by ground spraying of 2,4-fl); Shultz
v. Harless, 271 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) (cotton damaged by ground
spraying of 2,4-D).
Recovery denied: Harris v. United States, 205 F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1953)
(cotton and peanuts damaged by 2,4-D); Bowden v. United States, 200 F.2d
176 (4th Cir. 1952) (sheep allegedly killed by poisonous spray); Gainey v.
Folkman, 114 F. Supp. 231 (D. Ariz. 1953) (cattle allegedly damaged by DDT);
Pruett v. Burr, 118 Cal. App. 2d 188, 257 P.2d 690 (1953) (cotton damaged by
2,4-D); Lenk v. Spezia, 95 Cal. App. 2d 296, 213 P.2d 47 (1949) (bees killed
by arsenical); Jeanes v. Holtz, 94 Cal. App. 2d 826, 211 P.2d 925 (1949) (bees
killed by Cryolite 70); Alm v. Johnson, 75 Idaho 521, 275 P.2d 959 (1954) (pea
crop damaged by weed killing spray); Council v. Duprel, 250 Miss. 269, 165
So. 2d 134 (1964) (cotton and bean crops allegedly damaged by 2,4,5-T);
Wall v. Trogdon, 249 N.C. 747, 107 S.E.2d 757 (1959) (fish allegedly killed
by poisonous spray); Vrazel v. Bieri, 294 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956)
(cotton damaged by 2,4-D); Gamblin v. Ingram, 378 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1964) (cotton damaged by 2,4-fl).
Recovery denied but distinguishable on the facts: Neff v. Imperial Irri-
gation Dist., 142 Cal. App. 2d 755, 299 P.2d 359 (1956) (cotton damaged by
ground spraying of 2,4-fl); Rabin v. Lake Worth Drainage Dist., 82 So. 2d
353 (Fla. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 958 (1956) (pepper crop retarded by
ground spraying of herbicide); Dallas County Flood Control Dist. v. Benson,
157 Tex. 617, 306 S.W.2d 350 (1957) (cotton damaged by ground spraying of
2,4-D).
89 'Bowden v. United States, 200 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1952); Gainey v.
Folkman, 114 F. Supp. 231 (D. Ariz. 1953); Council v. Duprel, 250 Miss. 269,
165 So. 2d 134 (1964); Wall v. Trogdon, 249 N.C. 747, 107 S.E.2d 757 (1959);
Pruett v. Burr, 118 Cal. App. 2d 188, 257 P.2d 690 (1953).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol 19
CROP DUSTING
case he failed to establish damage.40 Thus, where the plaintiff estab-
lished his damage and that the defendant's dusting operation caused
it, recovery was allowed in all but eight cases. Six of the eight re-
maining cases involved unusual circumstances. Four times govern-
mental immunities barred recovery,41 and two decisions for the de-
fendant turned on the questions of contributory negligence and the
"trespassing bee" theory.4 2 In the seventh case the plaintiff lost on a
procedural technicality.43 In the last case, the plaintiff failed to
establish that the defendant's conduct amounted to negligence. 44 The
results are clear: except for unusual circumstances, the plaintiff al-
most always recovers when he has established causation and damage.
Moreover, the questions most frequently litigated before the ap-
pellate courts involve the proof of causation and the measure of dam-
ages, and not the manner in which the defendant's activities were
carried out.45 Thus causation and damage have been the key issues
before the appellate courts.
This is not to suggest that the courts have held crop dusting per
se an act of negligence. On the contrary, many of the courts46
have followed the proposition propounded in the early case of Miles v.
A. Arena & Co.:47
[I]n itself, dusting vegetables to kill pests that prey upon them is a
necessary and lawful operation which the owner of the vegetables
may perform, either himself or through his servants, or may have
performed by an independent contractor. However, he should not
do the dusting, or have it done, under conditions which would indicate
to a reasonably prudent person that damage to his neighbors would
result.48
40 Aim v. Johnson, 75 Idaho 521, 257 P.2d 959 (1954).
41 Harris v. United States, 205 F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1953); Neff v. Im-
perial Irrigation Dist., 142 Cal. App. 2d 755, 299 P.2d 359 (1956); Rabin v.
Lake Worth Drainage Dist., 82 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
958 (1956); Dallas County Flood Control Dist. v. Benson, 157 Tex. 617, 306
S.W.2d 350 (1957).
42 Lenk v. Spezia, 95 Cal. App. 2d 296, 213 P.2d 47 (1949); Jeanes v.
Holtz, 94 Cal. App. 2d 826, 211 P.2d 925 (1949). See text accompanying notes
90-98 infra; Note, supra note 18, at 76-77.
43 See Vrazel v. Bieri, 294 S.W.2d 148, 151-52 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956). A
careful reading of the opinion suggests that the plaintiff incorrectly chal-
lenged the jury's verdict. See note 55 infra.
44 Gamblin v. Ingram, 378 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
45 Interview with Stuart W. Turner; see, e.g., Lundberg v. Bolin, 67 Ariz.
259, 194 P.2d 454 (1948); Lawler v. Skelton, 241 Miss. 274, 130 So. 2d 565
(1961); Kentucky Aerospray, Inc. v. Mays, 251 S.W.2d 460 (Ky. 1952); Faire
v. Burke, 363 Mo. 562, 252 S.W.2d 289 (1952); Burke v. Thomas, 313 P.2d
1082 (Okla. 1957); McPherson v. Billington, 399 S.W.2d 186 (Tex. Civ. App.
1966); Pitchfork Land & Cattle Co. v. King, 162 Tex. 331, 346 S.W.2d 598
(1961); Aerial Sprayers, Inc. v. Yerger, Hill & Son, 306 S.W.2d 433 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1957).
46 E.g., Burns v. Vaughn, 216 Ark. 128, 224 S.W.2d 365 (1949); Faire
v. Burke, 363 Mo. 562, 252 S.W.2d 289 (1952).
47 23 Cal. App. 2d 680, 73 P.2d 1260 (1937).
48 Id. at 683, 73 P.2d at 1262.
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There have been many cases in which the defendant was held liable
for truly negligent conduct. Defendants, for instance, have been
liable on the basis of negligence, for the following activities: continu-
ing to spray while flying over the plaintiff's land;49 mistaking the
plaintiff's land for that of the defendant; 0 and dusting in a "strong"
wind blowing toward the plaintiff's land.51 In other cases the negli-
gent character of the conduct is not quite as clear.5 2  Defendants
have been held liable for dusting in adverse weather described as a
"light wind,"53 "light breeze,"54 and "breeze."'55
The Negligence Theory Breaks Down
There are indications that where there is little or no evidence of
fault on the defendant's part, the negligence theory breaks down. An
examination of the Texas cases is particularly instructive on this point.
The Texas courts have long and consistently rejected the doctrine of
Rylands v. Fletcher56 and have not yet professed to apply strict liabil-
ity to activities causing property damage.57 Accordingly, proper pro-
cedure requires that crop dusting cases be brought to the courts on
the theory of negligence.58
In the 1954 case of Shultz v. Harless59 the defendant used a poi-
sonous chemical to spray weeds in a ditch near the plaintiff's cotton.
Some of the spray drifted onto the cotton and caused considerable
damage. Upon these facts, the defendant was found negligent because
he knew or should have known of the destructive effect the chemical
would have on growing cotton and because he failed to confine the
49 McKennon v. Jones, 219 Ark. 671, 244 S.W.2d 138 (1951); Hammond
Ranch Corp. v. Dodson, 199 Ark. 846, 136 S.W.2d 484 (1940); Pendergrass v.
Lovelace, 57 N.M. 661, 262 P.2d 231 (1953); Burke v. Thomas, 313 P.2d 1082
(Okla. 1957); Heeb v. Prysock, 219 Ark. 899, 245 S.W.2d 577 (1952).
50 Cross v. Harris, 230 Ore. 398, 370 P.2d 703 (1962); cf. Schronk v. Gil-
liam, 380 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
51 Faire v. Burke, 363 Mo. 562, 252 S.W.2d 289 (1952).52 The following analysis was first suggested in Note, supra note 18, at 78.
53 Miles v. A. Arena & Co., 23 Cal. App. 2d 680, 682, 73 P.2d 1260, 1261
(1937).
54 Id. at 685, 73 P.2d at 1263.
55 Burns v. Vaughn, 216 Ark. 128, 129, 224 S.W.2d 365, 366 (1949).
56 L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868). "The 'rule' of Rylands v. Fletcher is that the
defendant will be liable when he damages another by a thing or activity un-
duly dangerous and inappropriate to the place where it is maintained, in the
light of the character of that place and its surroundings." W. PROssEz, TORTS
§ 77, at 522 (3d ed. 1964).
s7 Vrazel v. Bieri, 294 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956); Standard Paving
Co. v. McClinton, 146 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940); Indian Territory
Illuminating Oil Co. v. Rainwater, 140 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940);
Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 128 Tex. 155, 96 S.W.2d 221 (1936); Gulf, C. &
S.F.R.R. v. Oakes, 94 Tex. 155, 58 S.W. 999 (1900).
58 Vrazel v. Bieri, 294 S.W.2d 148, 152 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
59 271 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App.).
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poison to his land.60 Two years later a case was litigated6 ' in which
the defendant dusted his rice fields with 2,4-D. Some of the spray
drifted several miles before it settled upon and injured the plaintiff's
cotton. The only evidence of negligence was that the defendant failed
to confine the spray to his field. In a special verdict, the jury con-
cluded that this failure did not constitute negligence. Although the
appellate court affirmed the decision, a careful reading of the opinion
indicates that the result might have been different had the plaintiff
properly challenged the jury's verdict.62
Perhaps more revealing is Aerial Sprayers, Inc. v. Yerger, Hill
& Son.68 The defendant had his farm aerially sprayed with 2,4-D. At
the time of spraying the "wind direction" (the velocity does not appear
in the opinion) was toward the plaintiff's cotton which was 5 miles
away. Several days later the plaintiff's cotton manifested signs of
damage caused by 2,4-D. There was evidence that no other spraying
of 2,4-D had been done in the vicinity during the period in question.
From these facts the defendants were found to have caused the dam-
age and were liable because they failed to confine the herbicide to
the farm.64 Failure to confine the herbicide to the defendant's land
constituted a specific act of negligence! 65
The most extreme case of this kind was decided by the Texas
Supreme Court in 1961.66 An aerial spraying company treated a ranch
with 2,4-D. Damage to cotton located from 712 to 15 miles away was
discovered about 16 days after the spraying. There was evidence that
a wind of some velocity (5 to 8 miles per hour) 67 was blowing toward
the plaintiff's cotton and that no other such operations were conducted
in the area during the time involved. The record is devoid of any
direct evidence that defendant's crop dusting operation caused the
plaintiff's damage. The only negligence pleaded was that the defend-
ants had allowed the herbicide to drift.68 Recovery against the spray-
ing company was allowed.
Since it not infrequently occurs in negligence cases that the mere
fact of injury caused by the defendant's instrumentality under his
control is enough to establish negligent conduct, it is possible that
the Texas courts relied upon the principles of res ipsa loquitur to sup-
60 Id. at 698.
61 Vrazel v. Bieri, 294 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
62 The plaintiff should have asked the court to set aside the verdict
either as lacking support in, or as being contrary to, the weight of the evi-
dence. See, id. at 151, 152.
63 306 S.W.2d 433 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
64 Id. at 436.
65 Id.
66 Pitchfork Land & Cattle Co. v. King, 162 Tex. 331, 346 S.W.2d 598.
67 Id. at 337, 346 S.W.2d at 602.
68 Id. at 333, 346 S.W.2d at 599.
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port a finding of negligence. With one exception, 69 this possibility
has not been mentioned in any of the cases, nor does it appear any-
where that the doctrine has been asserted in support of an allegation
of negligence. Furthermore, the fundamental assumption behind res
ipsa loquitur-that such damage normally does not happen without
negligence-seems against the courts' understanding of the drift haz-
ards inherent in crop dusting.70 The conclusion seems inescapable-
to the extent that the Texas courts hold that the failure to confine
pesticides to the defendant's land is negligence, they are applying a
standard of strict liability to crop dusting activities under the name
of negligence.
Though only one crop dusting case has reached Kentucky's high-
est court,71 that case resembles the Texas pattern. Defendant aerially
sprayed toxaphene on a tobacco patch about 110 feet from a pond
teeming with commercially raised minnows. Some of the spray set-
tled on the pond and poisoned the fish. The only reason given by the
court for holding the defendant negligent and liable was that he had
"allowed the chemical compound to settle in the pond in the spraying
operation so that the minnows were poisoned." 72 A possible explana-
tion of this decision is that the risk of harm created by spraying 110
feet from a vulnerable target far outweighed the utility to be
gained.7 3 The dusting itself constituted negligence. However, there
is nothing mentioned in the opinion to support such an explanation.
The standards formulated in the Arkansas cases do not coincide
with the exacting limitations placed upon crop dusting in Texas and
Kentucky. Nevertheless, liability has been found where the only
evidence of fault lay in the dusting itself.7 4 Also, the mere knowl-
edge of the propensities of dusting chemicals to drift has been pointed
to as evidence of negligence.7 5 These results have occurred despite
the court's insistence that a defendant who uses dusting chemicals
"is not liable to his neighbor in every case; negligence must be
shown."76
The Arizona opinions, likewise, suggest a strict adherence to a
showing of negligence before liability will attach to crop dusting
69 Vrazel v. Bieri, 294 S.W.2d 148, 152 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
70 See Aerial Sprayers, Inc. v. Yerger, Hill & Son, 306 S.W.2d 433, 435
(Tex. Civ. App. 1957). Crop dusting is an inherently dangerous activity.
Leonard v. Abbott, 357 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962), rev'd on other
grounds, 366 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1963).
71 Kentucky Aerospray, Inc. v. Mays, 251 S.W.2d 460 (Ky. 1952).
72 Id. at 462.
73 Note, supra note 18, at 80.
74 Kennedy v. Clayton, 216 Ark. 851, 227 S.W.2d 934 (1950).
75 Burns v. Vaughn, 216 Ark. 128, 224 S.W.2d 365 (1949).
76 Id.
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activities.7 7 Arizona, however, was one of the first jurisdictions to
declare crop dusting an inherently dangerous activity,78 an activity
that affords no relief to an employer from liability for damage caused
by the negligence of his independent contractor. The opinion in Ger-
rard v. Fricker79 as to the dangerous nature of crop dusting activities
was reiterated in Crouse v. Wilbur-Ellis Co.80 where the court said:
It is settled law in Arizona that the risk of harm to neighboring
property from dusting or spraying by airplane is very great .... 81
Perhaps as a result little evidence is necessary to get a case to the
jury. In one case 82 the defendant had his land dusted with an arseni-
cal compound, part of which "drifted" 880 feet over plaintiff's land
and fell on his bees. Without more evidence, the defendant was held
liable on the theory of negligence. In another case 83 a dairy herd
consumed a poisonous insecticide84 which was "carried over and on"
plaintiff's feeding pen as a result of defendant's crop dusting opera-
tion. No other evidence of negligence appears in the opinion. Again
the plaintiff recovered. It is, of course, possible that there was evi-
dence, not included in the opinion, of some conduct, other than the
crop dusting itself, which would support a finding of negligence.8 5
But the stated facts and results are more consistent with the theory of
strict liability.
In California, judicial attitudes toward crop dusting activities first
became apparent in a 1937 decision.80 Dusting was not a matter of
negligence per se, for it was necessary to farmers and the agricultural
economy in the battle to control pests. 87 In this case, however, de-
fendant's failure to exercise reasonable care consisted of dusting in a
"light wind" a half mile from the plaintiff's land.8 8 Adams v. Hen-
ning89 is another good example of how little evidence is required to
make out a case of negligence where damage from crop dusting is
alleged. It was there held error to grant a nonsuit where:
... a part of the evidence would justify an inference that some of
this spray [which defendants released from an airplane over the de-
fendant's land] was deposited on at least a part of the plaintiff's land,
and that some damage resulted therefrom.9 0
77 Crouse v. Wilbur-Ellis Co., 77 Ariz. 359, 272 P.2d 352 (1954); Sanders
v. Beckwith, 79 Ariz. 67, 283 P.2d 235 (1954).
78 S.A. Gerrard v. Fricker, 42 Ariz. 503, 27 P.2d 678 (1933).
79 Id.
80 77 Ariz. 359, 272 P.2d 352 (1954).
81 Id. at 365, 272 P.2d at 356.
82 Lundberg v. Bolon, 67 Ariz. 259, 194 P.2d 454 (1948).
88 Sanders v. Beckwith, 79 Ariz. 67, 283 P.2d 235 (1955).
84 DDT and benzene hexachloride. Id. at 69, 283 P.2d at 237.
85 See id. at 72, 283 P.2d at 239.
86 Miles v. A. Arena & Co., 23 Cal. App. 2d 680, 73 P.2d 1260.
87 Id. at 683, 73 P.2d at 1262.
88 Id. at 682, 73 P.2d at 1261.
89 117 Cal. App. 2d 376, 255 P.2d 456 (1953).
90 Id. at 378, 255 P.2d at 457.
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The opinion does not mention any questionable conduct other than
the dusting itself.
On the other hand, California courts have twice handed down
decisions in favor of defendants. In Jeanes v. Holtz91 plaintiff's bees
"trespassed" onto defendant's freshly dusted crops and were conse-
quently killed. It may be inferred from the decision that the defend-
ant did not owe a duty of care to trespassing bees9 2 In Lenk v.
Spezia93 the defendant repeatedly warned a beekeeper to protect his
bees from the drift hazard involved in defendant's crop dusting opera-
tion. Fully aware of the danger, the plaintiff ignored the warnings,
refused defendant's help, then "deliberately" released his bees and
permitted them to search the surrounding fields for nectar and pollen.
He lost his bees and was barred from recovery for his contributory
negligence.9 4 Defendant admitted dusting his field with an arsenical
powder, but this admission was the only evidence of negligence on his
part accepted by the court.95 It seems clear that the plaintiff volun-
tarily encountered a known danger; he conducted himself in a manner
which bars recovery in both negligence and strict liability cases. 96
Normally a choice is not voluntary if the only available alternative
involves the sacrifice of a valuable right.97 The court may have con-
cluded, however, that the slight effort involved in protecting his bees
did not constitute such an intrusion or imposition upon the plaintiff
as to amount to a taking of a valuable right. Had the plaintiff been
warned against possible harm to growing crops, which cannot be as
easily protected, certainly a different result should be expected.98
In fact, there are indications in Lenk v. Spezia that contributory
negligence had little effect upon the result and that the plaintiff actu-
ally lost because he failed to establish causation.99
However confusing it is to determine the theory of liability applied
by the California courts to past cases, the theory to be applied in the
future seems clear. Legislation regulating crop dusting'0 0 has appar-
ently culminated in a decision to subject those crop dusting activities
which produce substantial drift to strict liability.10' Since the statute
makes it a crime to crop dust in such a manner as to cause substantial
91 94 Cal. App. 2d 826, 211 P.2d 925 (1949).
92 See id. at 830, 211 P.2d at 927, 928.
93 95 Cal. App. 2d 296, 213 P.2d 47 (1949).
94 Id. at 305, 213 P.2d at 53.
95 Id.
96 W. PROssEa, ToRTs § 78, at 539 (3d ed. 1964).
97 Id. § 67, at 466.
98 See Cambell v. Seaman, 63 N.Y. 568 (1876).
99 95 Cal. App. 2d 296, 305, 213 P.2d 47, 50 (1949).
100 CAL. AGRIC. CODE §§ 11401-04, 11501-13, 11531, 11701-10, 11731-41,
11761-65, 11791-92, 11901-13, 11932-40, 12971, 14002-06, 14011; 3 CAL. ADM.
CODE §§ 2448-55, 2460-64, 3070-3114.
101 CAL. AGRIC. CODE § 12972.
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drift, the effect of its enforcement is to protect sensitive property
from harm caused by the substantial drift of chemicals. In light of
the many and detailed statutory provisions regulating crop dusting
activities in existence prior to the enactment of this statute, it may
easily be concluded that the purpose of the statute was to aid in mak-
ing sensitive, neighboring property safe from harm caused by such
drift. In California an unexcused violation of a criminal statute the
purpose of which is to promote safety is negligence. 10 2 Given the fact
that substantial drift may result from crop dusting notwithstanding
the exercise of all reasonable care,10 3 the end result of the statute is to
impose strict liability upon crop dusting activities producing sub-
stantial drift.
It can hardly be said that the weight of authority is against bur-
dening crop dusting with strict liability. Even in jurisdictions which
profess to require a showing of negligence, the margin of error per-
mitted in the defendant's conduct is quite narrow.
Inadequacies of the Negligence Theory
Assuming for the moment that crop dusting is a proper subject
for strict liability, the question may be asked whether the theory of
negligence as applied in the cases is not adequate to cope with the
damage produced by crop dusting activities.
The question must be answered in the negative, however, as there
is at least one major, distinct difference between these two theories.
In any case litigated under the theory of negligence, a finding of the
failure to exercise reasonable care for the safety of the plaintiff's
interest is a prerequisite for recovery. 04  The possibility that the
trier of fact will not make such a finding always exists. In Vrazel v.
Bieri'0 5 and Gamblin v. Ingram' 0 the plaintiffs were faced with just
this obstacle; they failed to overcome it. Thus, when a court pro-
ceeds upon the theory of negligence, it is quite possible for a plaintiff
to establish causation and damage and still not recover.
Another objection to the theory of negligence as applied to the
facts peculiar to crop dusting operations is found in the problem of
proof. Where liability is predicated upon negligence, the plaintiff
must prove more than that he suffered damage caused by the particu-
lar defendant's crop dusting activities. In addition, he must prove
that the defendant owed him a duty to exercise reasonable care to
102 See Satterlee v. Orange Glenn School Dist., 29 Cal. 2d 581, 177 P.2d
279 (1947); 18 Ops. CAL. AT'Y GzT. 221 (1951).
.03 See text accompanying notes 8-30 supra.
104 W. PROSSER, TORTS § 30, at 146 (3d ed. 1964).
105 294 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
106 378 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964),
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avoid injury to him and that the defendant failed to meet that obli-
gation.10 7 In crop dusting cases, however, damage caused by 2,4-D
and other harmful chemicals often is not readily apparent. It is not
unusual for 10 to 14 days to elapse before damage is detectable 08
Even then, an expert may be needed to discover the damage.10 9 To
the extent that there is a considerable lapse of time between the crop
dusting and the manifestation of damage, the plaintiff loses the ad-
vantage of having immediate notice of the possibility of tortious con-
duct. The delay in acquiring notice may make it difficult for him
to discover what conduct of the defendant led to his damage. It is
believed that the ramification of this delay presents a problem of
proof which the plaintiff does not encounter in other cases of property
damage, such as automobile accidents or burned buildings, where the
possibility of tortious conduct is readily apparent.
It is one major undertaking to trace his damage to the crop dust-
ing activities of the defendant and to eliminate all other probable
sources; 10 and then another undertaking to establish that the pilot
failed in some way to exercise reasonable care."' Moreover, the for-
midable aid 12 of res ipsa loquitur is not generally applicable to this
dilemma, for chemical hazards and potential drift problems inhere in
any crop dusting operation, 113 and the courts in almost every jurisdic-
tion recognize that poisonous chemicals may drift, at least for some
distance, notwithstanding the exercise of all reasonable care.114
Another negative response to the question propounded lies in the
general policy in favor of clarity in the law. To the extent that courts,
professing to apply the theory of negligence, actually apply the
theory of strict liability to crop dusting activities, confusion and un-
certainty are added to the law of negligence. Furthermore, even in
107 W. PROSSER, TORTS § 30, at 146 (3d ed. 1964).
10s See Pitchfork Land & Cattle Co. v. King, 162 Tex. 331, 346 S.W.2d 598
(1961).
109 See id.
110 Interview with Stuart W. Turner; Note, supra note 18, at 85.
'11 Much dusting is done at night when it is more difficult for potential
witnesses to ascertain negligent conduct. See Taylor, Night Dusting, F=YnG,
June 1959, at 37.
112 See W. PROSSER, TORTS § 40 (3d ed. 1964).
113 See text accompanying notes 8-30 supra.
114 See S.A. Gerrard Co. v. Fricker, 42 Ariz. 503, 27 P.2d 678 (1933);
Chapman Chem. Co. v. Taylor, 215 Ark. 630, 222 S.W.2d 820 (1949); Miles v.
A. Arena & Co., 23 Cal. App. 2d 680, 73 P.2d 1260 (1937); Gotreaux v. Gary,
232 La. 373, 94 So. 2d 293 (1957); Faire v. Burke, 363 Mo. 562, 252 S.W.2d
289 (1952); Council v. Duprel, 250 Miss. 269, 165 So. 2d 134 (1964); Smith v.
Okerson, 8 N.J. Super. 560, 73 A.2d 857 (Super. Ct. 1950); Pendergrass v.
Lovelace, 57 N.M. 661, 262 P.2d 231 (1953); Young v. Darter, 363 P.2d 829
(Okla. 1961); Loe v. Lenhardt, 227 Ore. 242, 362 P.2d 312 (1961); Alexander
v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 221 S.C. 477, 71 S.E.2d 299 (1952); Aerial Sprayers,
Inc. v. Yerger, Hill & Son, 306 S.W.2d 433 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
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the aggregate, the negligence cases do not delineate a standard of care
which, if followed, would exonerate the applicator from liability for
some unforeseen damage. The result of the negligence cases is con-
fusion in pleadings,1 5 in requirements of proof,"6 and in viable de-
fenses to complaints." 7
Is Crop Dusting an Abnormally Dangerous Activity?
Currently before the American Law Institute is a proposal"8 to
repeal the definition of an ultrahazardous activity as found in section
520 1 of the 1938 Restatement of Torts, and to substitute in its place
a list of factors to be considered in determining whether an activity is
abnormally dangerous, and therefore, subject to strict liability. These
factors are:
(a) Whether the activity involves a high degree of risk of some
harm to the person, land or chattels of others;
(b) Whether the gravity of the harm which may result from it is
likely to be great;
(c) Whether the risk cannot be eliminated by the exercise of reason-
able care;
(d) Whether the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) Whether the activity is inappropriate to the place where it is
carried on; and
(f) The value of the activity to the community.120
Because the first two factors are closely related, they are best dis-
cussed together.
Risk and Gravity of Harm
It cannot be doubted that crop dusting exposes sensitive, neigh-
boring property to a high degree of risk of serious harm. Because the
distribution of the chemicals is inevitably subject to factors beyond
the pilot's control,' 21 there inheres in every dusting operation the pos-
sibility that some of the chemicals will be carried far from the target
area.122 Added to this possibility is the chemical hazard and, as a
115 See, e.g., Reed v. Coyner Crop Dusters, 83 Ariz. 153, 317 P.2d 944
(1957).
116 See e.g., Adams v. Henning, 117 Cal. App. 2d 376, 255 P.2d 456 (1953);
Pruett v. Burr, 118 Cal. App. 2d 188, 257 P.2d 690 (1953). Compare Aerial
Sprayers, Inc. v. Yerger, Hill & Son, 306 S.W.2d 433 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956),
with Gamblin v. Ingram, 378 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
117 See, e.g., Heeb v. Prysock, 219 Ark. 899, 245 S.W.2d 577 (1952).
118 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
119 Section 520 reads: "An activity is ultra hazardous if it (a) necessarily
involves a risk of serious harm to the person, land, or chattels of others which
cannot be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care, and (b) is not a
matter of common usage."
120 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
121 See text accompanying notes 8-30 supra.
122 Id.
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result, every crop dusting operation involves the risk that valuable
neighboring property may be seriously damaged, if not destroyed.
Reported recoveries have run as high as $10,000.123 That the risk
of causing damage to valuable property is very great is suggested
not only by the numerous reported cases, 124 but also by the dif-
ficulty encountered by the applicator in obtaining liability insur-
ance. 125 Moreover, the courts which predicate liability upon a show-
ing of negligence generally concede that crop dusting is an activity
that cannot be done safely without the exercise of the utmost care. 126
That the degree and gravity of the risk will be alleviated in the
near future is doubtful. Even though the crop dusting industry in
recent years has witnessed many technological advancements, the
problems presented by the chemical and drift hazards continue to defy
solution. 127 Though down draft produced by whirling rotor blades
tends to reduce drift, 128 even helicopter pilots experience problems
with drift.129 Furthermore, the crop dusting industry has not yet
settled on a consistent approach to the conflicting goals of efficient
coverage and reduced drift. Increased nighttime dusting operations
mark one recent attempt to reduce drift by working in more favorable
weather conditions than prevail during the warmer daylight hours.130
However, some of the advantages gained thereby are lost because
reduced visibility impairs the pilot's ability to detect changing direc-
tions of air flow.' 31 On the other hand, to achieve more efficient cov-
erage, experiments are now being conducted with ultra low volume
(ULV) 132 pesticides which involve the application of undiluted chem-
icals. The drift propensities of such treatment are not yet known,133
although it is feared that drift hazards will be increased.134
Risk Not Eliminated by Reasonable Care
The third factor requires little comment. Since drift can
neither be accurately predicted nor completely controlled,135 there
123 Crouse v. Wilbur-Ellis Co., 77 Ariz. 359, 272 P.2d 352 (1954); Sanders
v. Beckwith, 79 Ariz. 67, 283 P.2d 235 (1954).
124 Cases cited notes 32-34, 38 supra.
125 Note, Liability for Chemical Damage from Aerial Crop Dusting, 43
vINN. L. REv. 531, 542 (1959).
126 For cases holding that crop dusting is an inherently dangerous activity,
see note 9 supra.
127 See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
128 Invading Agricultural Market, AwVAnON WEEK, Nov. 25, 1963, at 112,
115.
129 Interview with Stuart W. Turner.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 ULV Will It Steal the Market?, FAmu CHE IcALs, July 1967, at 10-18.
133 Id. at 16.
134 Id.
135 See text accompanying notes 8-30 supra.
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remains in crop dusting activities a high degree of risk of serious harm
to sensitive, neighboring property even though the applicator has
taken all reasonable precautions in advance, and has exercised all
reasonable care in his dusting operation.136
Common Usage
The meaning of the term "common usage" and its application
to crop dusting activities has not always been clear.137 Fortunately,
the comments to section 520 have been expanded in the Tentative
Draft. It now appears that whether an activity is a matter of common
usage depends upon the percentage of the population engaged in
carrying on the activity. The comments, for example, suggest that the
operation of a motor vehicle is not a proper subject for strict liability
because many people engage in this activity; motor vehicle registra-
tions, as an indication of this common usage, totalled over 90 million
in 1965,138 while over 98,000 drivers were licensed in that year alone. 39
On the other hand, crop dusting does not begin to qualify as a matter
of common usage as only a small portion of the farm population is
engaged in applying sprays and dusts from the air. About 5,000
airplanes and 4,000 applicators are employed in crop dusting in the
United States.140
Inappropriateness to Its Surroundings
The comments to the fifth factor suggest that the important
thing about an activity burdened with strict liability is "not that it is
extremely dangerous in itself, but that it is abnormally so in relation
to its surroundings."' 4' It is economic suicide for a cotton, tomato, or
grape grower to dust his crops with 2,4-D.142 The pesticide 2,4-D is
neither a natural nor a common enemy of these crops. It presents an
unusual threat to their existence. Thus, the dispersing of 2,4-D and
other hazardous chemicals in the vicinity of these broad leaf crops
presents an abnormal danger to them and, likewise, to other sensitive
property such as livestock and colonies of bees.
This abnormal danger, however, is not merely limited to the im-
mediate vicinity of sensitive property. For destructive herbicides oc-
casionally drift miles before damaging valuable property. The appel-
136 Id.
137 Note, supra note 18, at 82-83.
138 AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS AsSOCIATION, 1967 AUTOMOBILE FACTS
AND F GURES 26 (1967).
'39 Id. at 53.
140 FAA Crop-Dusting Crash Study May Result in Safer Pesticide, AVIA-
TiON WEEK, Oct. 22, 1962, at 35.
141 RESTATEMENT (SEcoN) or TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 520-3, at 57
(Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
142 Note 10 supra.
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late reports include cases where the chemical drifted 3,'143 10,144 15,'145
and 20146 miles. In the light of these facts very few crop dusting oper-
ations are not abnormally dangerous in relation to their surroundings.
Perhaps the dusting of wheat in the midst of a vast wheat belt, such
as might exist on the Great Plains, would be so far removed from sens-
itive property as to qualify as an appropriate place to conduct this
activity. Other, similar examples are difficult to conceive.
Value to the Community
Notwithstanding that crop dusting qualifies in the first five re-
spects as an abnormally dangerous activity, according to the sixth
factor, it may be that this activity is too valuable to the agricultural
community to burden it with strict liability. Crop losses, caused
by pests of all kinds, annually run into hundreds of millions of dol-
lars.147  One step toward eliminating this loss is to control, perhaps
even eradicate, destructive pests. Since the aerial application of pesti-
cides is the most efficient, 148 in some cases, the only way in which
pest control can be accomplished, 149 the benefits to be gained from
these operations are valuable to both the public and the farmer. This
value has long been recognized by the courts. Beginning with a
case' 50 in 1937 the courts have generally held that crop dusting is not
in itself a matter of negligence or, in other words, that the benefits
derived from crop dusting outweigh the risk that damage to neigh-
boring property may result.' 51
There is good reason to believe, however, that crop dusting is
not an activity essential to the livelihood of the members of the agri-
cultural community. In a mixed farming state such as California it
is possible that as much harm as gain can result from crop dusting.
In California, the aerial application of pesticides is not only strictly
regulated,' 52 it is also prohibited in large areas of the state.'53 Even
143 Gotreaux v. Gary, 232 La. 375, 94 So. 2d 293 (1957); Dallas County
Flood Control Dist. v. Benson, 157 Tex. 617, 306 S.W.2d 350 (1957).
'44 Aerial Sprayers, Inc. v. Yerger, Hill & Son, 306 S.W.2d 433 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1957).
145 Pitchfork Land & Cattle Co. v. King, 162 Tex. 331, 346 S.W.2d 598
(1961).
146 Dallas County Flood Control Dist. v. Fowler, 280 S.W.2d 336 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1955).
'47 Assessable yield loss in California alone amounted to $162,886,355 in
1965. CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, BULL. No. E-82-8, at 8 (Sept. 23,
1966).
148 Tozer, supra note 1.
'49 Id.
150 Miles v. A. Arena & Co., 23 Cal. App. 2d 680, 73 P.2d 1260 (1937).
151 See text accompanying notes 46-48 supra.
152 See CAL. AGRIC. CODE §§ 11401-04, 11501-13, 11531, 11701-10, 11731-41,
11761-65, 11791-92, 11901-13, 11932-40, 12971, 14002-06, 14011; 3 CAL. ADM.
CODB §§ 2448-55, 2460-64, 3070-3114.
'53 E.g., 3 CAL. ADm. CODE §§ 2449, 2461.
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the ground application of pesticides is prohibited in certain places
during the growing season. 5 4 Other states in which mixed farming is
not as predominant as it is in California also have laws regulating the
application of pesticides. 55
The aerial application of pesticides is not the only method of con-
trolling pests. Ground application of pesticides, while not as econom-
ical as aerial application when done on a large scale,156 is still recog-
nized as a satisfactory method.157 Any assertion that crop dusting is
vital to the agricultural community is, therefore, open to question.
Conclusion
It is submitted that crop dusting is a proper subject for strict
liability. The imposition of strict liability upon crop dusting does not
result in liability for accidental damage. The element of fault in the
defendant's conduct is that he has intentionally exposed the plain-
tiff's valuable property to a high degree of risk of serious harm.5 8
It is believed that the courts rather than the legislatures should
effect the change from a requirement of a showing of "negligence" to
strict liability. It is well within the province of the judiciary to make
such a change. 59 Also, if and when the weight of the factors listed
in the Tentative Draft become favorable to the crop dusting industry,
a corresponding change in the theory of liability-from strict liability
to negligence-may be more readily accomplished by the courts than
by the legislatures. However, whether the change is made by the
courts or by the legislatures is a secondary matter. That the change
be made is the primary consideration and the conclusion of this com-
ment.
Richard S. Jensen*
154 The ground application of pesticides is prohibited between March 15
and October 15 on any area within 2 miles of vineyards or cotton crops. 3
CAL. ADM. CODE § 2450 (g).
3.5 See statutes compiled in Comment, Crop Dusting--Scope of Liability
and a Need for Reform in the Texas Law, 40 TEXAS L. REV. 527, 529 n.20
(1962); Note, Regulation and Liability in the Application of Pesticides, 49
IOWA L. REV. 135, 136-41 (1963).
156 Brandes, Aerial Application is Here to Stay, AGRicULTURAL CHsaVrcALs,
Jan. 1967, at 43-44.
157 See id.
158 Loe v. Lenhardt, 227 Ore. 242, 362 P.2d 312 (1961); W. PROssm, TORTS
§ 74, at 508 (3d ed. 1964).
159 Loe v. Lenhardt, 227 Ore. 242, 362 P.2d 312 (1961); RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 520, comment I at 68 (Tent. Draft
No. 10, 1964).
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